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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in excess of regulatory min-
imums. This did not prevent the financial crisis and underlines the importance of
understanding bank capital determination. Market discipline is one of the forces that
induces banks to hold positive capital. The literature has focused on the liability side.
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We develop a simple theory based on monitoring to show that discipline from the asset
side can also be important. In perfectly competitive markets, banks can find it optimal
to use costly capital rather than the interest rate on the loan to commit to monitoring
because it allows higher borrower surplus. (JEL G21, G28)
A common justification for capital regulation for banks is the reduction of bank moral
hazard. With high levels of leverage, there is an incentive for banks to take on excessive
risk. This incentive is reduced if banks have capital at risk. Given the widely accepted view
that equity capital is more costly for banks than other types of funds, the common result in
many analyses of bank regulation is that capital adequacy standards are binding as banks
attempt to economize on the use of this costly input.
In practice, however, it appears that banks are often willing to hold positive levels of
capital well above regulatory minima, and that actual capital holdings tend to vary indepen-
dently of regulatory changes. For example, comparing actual capital holdings to regulatory
requirements in the United States, Flannery and Rangan (2008) find that banks’ capital
ratios increased substantially in the last decade, with banks holding capital levels that were
75% in excess of the regulatory minima in the early 2000s. Similar cross-country evidence
is provided in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2005, Figure 3.8, p. 119). In search of an expla-
nation of the capital buildup in the United States throughout the 1980s, Ashcraft (2001)
finds little evidence that changes in banks’ capital structure were related to changes in reg-
ulatory requirements. From an international perspective, Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue
that Spanish banks’ capital ratios over the period 1985-1991 were primarily driven by the
pressure of market forces rather than regulatory constraints. Also, Alfon, Argimon, and
Bascunana-Ambros (2004) report that banks in the United Kingdom increased their capital
ratios in the last decade despite a reduction in their individual capital requirements, and
operated in the early 2000s with an average capital buffer of 35%-40%. Finally, Gropp and
Heider (2008) do not detect a first order effect of regulation on banks’ capital holdings.
Despite the fact that throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s banks had capital
levels well above regulatory minimums, the financial crisis that started in 2007 raises the
question of whether banks were in fact undercapitalized relative to some ideal social welfare
maximizing level. There are clearly many determinants of such an ideal level of capital
including many related to crisis factors such as the likelihood of contagion. At present
1
there are no encompassing theories that explain well how much capital banks should hold.
It remains an open question whether or not, despite having been well above regulatory
minimimums, banks were nevertheless undercapitalized.
In order to make progress in understanding bank capitalization, it is necessary to con-
sider the different determinants. One of the factors deemed important in inducing banks to
choose positive amounts of capital is market discipline. Typically such discipline has been
considered from the liability side [see, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Flan-
nery and Nikolova (2004) for a survey]. The purpose of our paper is to present a theory
that demonstrates that inducements to hold capital can also come from the asset side. We
show that when credit markets are competitive, market discipline coming from the asset side
induces banks to hold positive levels of capital as a way to commit to monitor and attract
borrowers.
We develop a simple one-period model of bank lending, where firms need external financ-
ing to make productive investments. Banks grant loans to firms and monitor them, which
helps improve firms’ expected payoff. Given that monitoring is costly and banks have limited
liability, banks are subject to a moral hazard problem in the choice of monitoring effort. One
way of providing them with greater incentives for monitoring is through the use of equity
capital. This forces banks to internalize the costs of their default, thus ameliorating the lim-
ited liability problem banks face due to their extensive reliance on deposit-based financing.
A second instrument to improve banks’ incentives is embodied in the loan rate. A marginal
increase in the loan rate gives banks a greater incentive to monitor in order to receive the
higher payoff if the project succeeds and the loan is repaid. Thus, capital and loan rates are
alternative ways to improve banks’ monitoring incentives, but entail different costs. Holding
capital implies a direct private cost for the banks, whereas increasing the loan rate has a
negative impact only for borrowers in terms of a lower return from the investment.
For most of our analysis, we consider the case where banks operate in a perfectly com-
petitive loan market so that borrower surplus is maximized. We first consider the case where
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there is no deposit insurance. Since depositors do not receive anything if banks’ projects are
unsuccessful, they require a premium in non-default states in order to be willing to deposit
their funds. By encouraging monitoring, bank capital reduces the premium that needs to be
offered to depositors, and thus provides a rationale for holding capital that acts through the
bank’s liabilities. In addition, there is also an asset-side incentive to hold capital, since the
market equilibrium entails a combination of capital and loan rate that maximizes borrower
surplus. The loan rate is set at the lowest level consistent with bank participation and the
remaining incentives for monitoring loans are provided by banks holding positive amounts
of capital. Thus, competition in the loan market induces banks to voluntarily hold positive
levels of capital as a way to commit to greater monitoring.
We then compare the market solution to the regulatory solution. Although in practice
capital regulation is driven by a wide variety of factors, such as systemic risk and asset
substitution, we focus on the benchmark solution where a regulator chooses the level of
capital to maximize social welfare so that we can assess the efficiency of the market solution.
We show that when the return on the firm’s project is sufficiently high, the market solution
is inefficient as it entails a level of capital above the social welfare maximizing level. The
reason is that the market solution maximizes borrower surplus, and borrowers prefer to use
as much capital as possible to provide incentives rather than using a higher loan rate. By
contrast, the regulator prefers to provide banks with incentives through the loan rate as it
is just a transfer and there is no inefficiently high cost as with capital. Thus, when the
project return is high, the regulator chooses a lower level of capital than the market because
a high loan rate is feasible. As the project return decreases, the market solution becomes
constrained efficient in that it provides the correct incentives from a social perspective to
hold a positive amount of capital. This is because when the project’s return is relatively low,
it is no longer possible to achieve the efficient level of monitoring through high loan rates
and incentives are provided by capital in the same way as in the market solution.
We then analyze the case where there is deposit insurance. When deposits are insured,
3
the degree of monitoring no longer affects a bank’s cost of deposits. Still, as in the case
without deposit insurance, the market solution entails a positive amount of capital as a
result of the competitive pressure in the credit market. For most of the parameter space,
the market level of capital is above the socially optimal level or is constrained efficient.
Our basic model can be extended in a number of directions. We first consider alternative
market structures to perfect competition in the loan market. When banks have monopoly
power and there is no deposit insurance, they use the loan rate as the primary incentive tool.
The bank’s incentives are correctly aligned with the objective of maximizing social welfare
and the market equilibrium is always constrained efficient. By contrast, the presence of fixed
deposit insurance introduces the standard moral hazard problem, thus creating a role for
capital regulation to improve efficiency. Our main results remain valid with intermediate
market structures between monopoly and competition where the surplus is split between
banks and borrowers. As a related way for banks to generate surplus, we consider the case
where banks have a franchise value from remaining in business. We find that franchise value
and capital are substitute ways of providing banks with monitoring incentives.
One of the issues that has been raised during the recent financial crisis is whether banks
had become too much transaction focused and thus neglected relationship banking. To see
how capital affects banks’ choices, we study a setting where banks choose between relation-
ship and transactional lending. The former refers to the monitored loan we have considered
so far, and the latter to a loan with a fixed lower probability of success but a higher payoff in
case of success. We show that capital regulation increases the attractiveness of relationship
loans as capital represents a pure cost in the case of transactional lending. Next, we sketch
a version of the model where bank monitoring helps alleviate an incentive problem on the
side of borrowers, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). We argue that the main insight that
competition leads banks to greater capitalization as a way to commit to greater monitoring
remains valid in this more complex framework. Finally, we briefly discuss the case of fairly
priced deposit insurance, where banks pay a premium that reflects their default probability.
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We show that this leads to the same results as without deposit insurance.
The paper has a number of empirical implications. First, our results are consistent with
the fact that banks voluntarily hold higher levels of capital than the regulatory minimum and
that changes in capital regulation do not affect banks’ capital structures. Second, the model
suggests that greater credit market competition increases capital holdings as it introduces
market discipline from the asset side. Third, the model suggests that banks that are more
involved in monitoring-intensive lending should be more capitalized and that, similarly, firms
for which monitoring adds the most value should prefer to borrow from banks with high
capital. Fourth, our analysis implies that banks’ capital holdings decrease with fixed deposit
insurance coverage. Fifth, our analysis suggests that increased capital requirements imply a
shift in banks’ portfolios away from transactional lending towards more relationship lending.
Finally, the model predicts that banks with a lower fraction of outside equity or in countries
with stronger shareholder rights should be more capitalized than banks with more dispersed
ownership.
Recent research on the role of bank capital has studied a variety of issues. Gale (2003,
2004) and Gale and Özgür (2005) consider the risk-sharing function of bank capital and the
implications for regulation. They show that less risk-averse equity holders share risk with
more risk-averse depositors. In contrast, in our model agents are risk-neutral so risk-sharing
plays no role in determining banks’ capital holdings.
Diamond and Rajan (2000) consider the interaction between the role of capital as a
buffer against shocks to asset values and banks’ role in the creation of liquidity. Closer
to our work, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) study the role of capital in determining banks’
lending capacities and providing incentives to monitor. Other studies such as Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo (2004), and Morrison and White (2005) analyze the
role of capital in reducing risk-taking. In contrast to these papers, our approach studies the
circumstances under which the market equilibrium is constrained efficient and the nature of
socially optimal capital regulation when it is not.
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Possible explanations for capital holding in excess of the regulatory minimum based
on dynamic considerations are suggested by Blum and Hellwig (1995), Bolton and Freixas
(2006), Peura and Keppo (2006), and Van den Heuvel (2008). In all of these, banks choose a
buffer above the regulatory requirement as a way to ensure they do not violate the regulatory
constraint. In these models, the capital holdings of banks would still be altered by regulatory
changes, something rarely observed in the data. Our model provides in a static framework
an explanation for why capital holdings may be positive and may not be driven by regulatory
changes.
In recent work, Mehran and Thakor (2009) study the link between bank capital holdings
and total bank value. Theoretically, they argue that the value of capital for banks is derived
from its role in encouraging monitoring. Banks with either a lower cost of equity or a lower
cost of monitoring hold more capital and monitor more. In addition to this direct effect on
monitoring, there is an indirect dynamic effect as these banks also have a higher probability of
survival, which provides further incentives to monitor. There is thus a positive relationship
between capital holdings and total bank value. Mehran and Thakor find empirical cross-
sectional support for this relationship. In our model all banks are identical and there is no
dynamic effect so that there is no cross sectional variation. Rather, we focus on the role of
competition in providing incentives to hold capital and show that such incentive can arise
even in a static setting.
In our model, using capital commits the bank to monitor. With no deposit insurance,
this allows the bank to raise deposits more cheaply as depositors’ confidence that they will
be repaid increases. On the lending side, the increased commitment to monitor makes a
bank with a large amount of capital more attractive to borrowers and thus improves its
“product market” opportunities. From this perspective, the use of capital in our model
is reminiscent of the literature on the interaction between capital structure and product
market competition, where debt has been identified as having a strategic role in committing
the firm to take actions it might not otherwise find optimal [see, for example, Brander and
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Lewis (1986); Maksimovic (1988); and Maksimovic and Titman (1991)].
Section 1 outlines the model. Section 2 considers banks’ choice of monitoring, taking
the loan rates and capital amounts as given. The case where there is no deposit insurance
is analyzed in Section 3, while the case with deposit insurance is investigated in Section
4. Section 5 extends the analysis in various directions. Section 6 contains the empirical
implications of our model. Section 7 concludes.
1 Model
Consider a simple one-period economy with firms and banks. Each firm has access to a risky
investment project and needs external funds to finance it. The banks lend to the firms and
monitor them. For ease of exposition, we assume throughout that each bank lends to one
firm only.
Each firm’s investment project requires 1 unit of funds and yields a total payoff of R
when successful and 0 when not. The firm raises the funds needed through a bank loan in
exchange for a promised total repayment rL. The credit market is assumed to be perfectly
competitive, so that the firm appropriates the surplus arising from the investment project.
(We discuss alternative market structures in Section 5.1.)
The bank finances itself with an amount of capital k at a total cost rE ≥ 1 per unit, and
an amount of deposits 1−k at a total per unit (normalized) opportunity cost of 1. The bank
promises rD to depositors. The deposit market is perfectly competitive so that the bank will
always set rD at the level required for depositors to recover their opportunity cost of funds
of 1 and be willing to participate. The assumption that rE ≥ 1 captures the idea that bank
capital is a more expensive form of financing than deposits, as is typically assumed in the
literature.1
The function of banks in the economy is to provide monitoring and thus improve firm
1See Berger et al. (1995) for a discussion of this issue; and Gorton and Winton (2003), Hellmann et al.
(2000), and Repullo (2004) for a similar assumption.
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performance. The bank chooses an unobservable monitoring effort q that for simplicity
represents the success probability of the firm it finances. Monitoring carries a cost of q2/2
for the bank. One way of thinking about this is that the bank observes information about
a firm and then uses this to help improve the firm’s performance. Another is that banks
and firms have complementary skills. Entrepreneurs have an expertise in running the firm,
while banks provide financial expertise and can thus help improve the firm’s expected value.2
What is important is that greater monitoring is desirable from the borrower’s perspective.
This framework leads to a partial equilibrium analysis focusing on a single bank where
the amount of capital k, the loan rate rL, the deposit rate rD, and the amount of monitoring
q are determined endogenously. All the variables other than q are publicly observable. The
determination of k and rL depends on the presence of a regulator. We consider two cases:
in the first one, which we call the “market case,” both k and rL are determined by the bank,
while in the other one, defined as the “regulatory case,” k is determined by a regulator who
maximizes social welfare and rL is still set by the bank.
The timing of the model is as follows. In the market case, the bank first selects the level
of capital k and then sets the deposit rate rD and the loan rate rL. The firm chooses whether
to take the loan and invest in the risky project. Then the bank chooses the monitoring effort
q. The regulatory case works similarly with the only difference that the regulator chooses
the level of capital k initially and then the bank sets rD and rL. Once chosen, k, rD, and rL
are observable to all agents. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model.
2See Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Boot and Greenbaum (1993), Boot and Thakor (2000), Carletti (2004),
and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) for studies with similar monitoring technologies. One justification of
this type of assumption is given by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). In their model, banks use information
acquired about the firm to improve liquiditation/continuation decisions and thus increase firm value. Boot
and Thakor (2000) suggest a number of other ways bank monitoring can improve firm performance (footnote
9, page 684).
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2 Equilibrium Bank Monitoring
We solve the model by backward induction, and begin with the bank’s optimal choice of
monitoring for a given amount of capital k, deposit rate rD, and loan rate rL. The bank
chooses its monitoring effort so as to maximize expected profits as given by:
max
q
Π = q(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2. (1)
The first term, q(rL − (1− k)rD), represents the expected return to the bank obtained only
when the project succeeds net of the repayment to depositors. The second term, krE, is the
opportunity cost of providing k units of capital, and the last term is the cost of monitoring.
The solution to this problem yields:
q = min {rL − (1− k)rD, 1} (2)
as the optimal level of monitoring for each bank. Note that, when q < 1, bank monitoring
effort is increasing in the loan rate rL as well as in the level of capital k the bank holds, but
it decreases in the deposit rate rD. Thus loan rates and capital are two alternative ways to
improve banks’ monitoring incentives.
This framework implies a moral hazard problem in the choice of monitoring when the
bank raises a positive amount of deposits. Since monitoring is unobservable, it cannot be
determined contractually. Given it is costly to monitor, the bank has a tendency not to
monitor properly unless it is provided with incentives to do so.
3 No Deposit Insurance
We now turn to the determination of the amount of capital k, the loan rate rL, and the
deposit rate rD. We start by analyzing the case where there is no deposit insurance. In
this case, the promised repayment must compensate depositors for the risk they face when
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placing their money in banks that may not repay. This introduces a liability-side disciplining
force on bank behavior since banks have to bear the cost of their risk-taking through a higher
promised deposit rate. The expected value of the promised payment rD must be at least
equal to depositors’ opportunity cost of 1. Given the level of capital k and the loan rate rL,
depositors conjecture a level of monitoring for the bank, q, and set the deposit rate to meet
their opportunity cost. This implies that qrD = 1, or that:
rD =
1
q
. (3)
The determination of k and rL depends on the presence of a regulator. We start with the
“market” solution in the absence of regulation and we then turn to the “regulatory” solution
in which a regulator who maximizes social welfare sets the level of capital.
The market solution solves the following problem:
max
k,rL,rD
BS = q(R− rL) (4)
subject to:
q = min {rL − (1− k)rD, 1} , (5)
qrD = 1, (6)
Π = q(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2 ≥ 0, (7)
BS = q(R− rL) ≥ 0, (8)
0 ≤ k ≤ 1. (9)
The bank chooses k, rL, and rD to maximize borrower surplus subject to a number of
constraints. The first constraint is the monitoring effort chosen by the bank in the final stage
after lending is determined. The second constraint is the depositors’ participation constraint
discussed above, which holds with equality given that the deposit market is competitive.
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The third and fourth constraints are the bank’s and the borrower’s participation constraints,
respectively. Note that the borrower’s participation constraint boils down to rL ≤ R if q > 0.
The last constraint is simply a physical constraint on the level of capital.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the following result.
Proposition 1 In the case of no deposit insurance, the market equilibrium is as follows:
A. For R ≥ 2− 1
2rE
, kBS = 1
2rE
, rL = 2− 12rE , rD = 1, q = 1, BS = SW = R− (2−
1
2rE
),
and Π = 0;
B. For R < 2− 1
2rE
, there is no intermediation.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¤
The results in Proposition 1 highlight that competition in the credit market induces banks
to keep a positive level of capital. When projects are sufficiently profitable and intermediation
is feasible (R > 2− 1
2rE
), banks fully monitor the firms so that q = 1. Banks derive incentives
to monitor from a combination of the loan rate and capital. These are substitute ways to
provide banks with incentives to monitor but differ in terms of their costs and effects on
borrower surplus and bank profits. Borrowers prefer banks to hold high levels of capital as a
way to commit to high levels of monitoring. By contrast, since capital is a costly input (i.e.,
rE ≥ 1), the bank would prefer to minimize its use and receive incentives through a higher
loan rate. While increasing rL is good for incentive purposes, its direct effect is to reduce
the surplus to the borrowers. Given that with competition the contract maximizes borrower
surplus, the equilibrium when there is intermediation entails the maximum level of capital
and the lowest level of loan rate consistent with q = 1 and the banks’ participation constraint.
In this sense, market discipline is imposed from the asset side as both the loan rate and the
bank’s capital are used to provide banks with monitoring incentives.3 In equilibrium, k
3A related issue is studied in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), who analyze how banks can develop a
reputation for committing to devote resources to evaluating firms in financial distress and thus make the
correct renegotiation versus liquidation decisions. Borrowers who anticipate running into difficulties may
therefore prefer to borrow from banks with a reputation for flexibility in dealing with firms in financial
distress. Reputation thus serves as a commitment device for banks similarly to capital in our model.
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decreases with the cost of capital rE while the loan rate rL increases with rE. This result
implies a negative correlation between capital and the loan rate as a function of the cost of
capital in the case of a competitive credit market.4
We next analyze the optimal choice of capital when a regulator sets it to maximize social
welfare and the loan rate is still determined as part of a market solution that maximizes
the surplus of borrowers. This provides a benchmark to assess the efficiency of the market.
Formally, a regulator solves the following problem:
max
k
SW = Π+BS = q(R− (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2, (10)
subject to the constraints (5)-(7) and (9), and
rL = argmax
r
BS = q(R− r) ≥ 0. (11)
The regulatory problem differs from the market problem in the objective function, which
is now social welfare rather than just borrower surplus. The constraints have the same
meaning as above, with constraint (11) indicating that the loan rate is still set in the market
to maximize borrowers’ surplus. The solution to the maximization problem is given below.
Proposition 2 In the case of no deposit insurance, the regulatory equilibrium is as follows:
A.1. For R ≥ 2, kreg = 0, rL = 2, rD = 1, q = 1, BS = R−2, Π = 12 , and SW = R−
3
2
;
A.2. For RAB ≤ R < 2, kreg = 1 − R
2
4
> 0, rL = R, rD = 2R , q =
R
2
, BS = 0, and
Π = SW = R
2
8
− (1− R2
4
)rE, where RAB =
4rE+2
√
rE+2r
2
E−6r3E+4r4E
rE+2r
2
E
;
B. For 2− 1
2rE
≤ R < RAB, kreg = 12rE > 0, rL = 2− k
reg, rD = 1, q = 1, BS = SW =
R− (2− 1
2rE
), and Π = 0;
C. For R < 2− 1
2rE
, there is no intermediation.
4Note that Proposition 1 has the feature that banks either monitor fully (q = 1) or there is no interme-
diation. This results from our assumption that the monitoring cost equals q2/2. If we modify it to cq2 with
c > 1/2, then we obtain an extra region with an interior solution for q. This considerably complicates the
analysis without providing any additional insights.
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Proof: See the Appendix. ¤
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2. The regulatory solution is quite different from
the market solution. The reason is that the regulator can choose kreg but has to take the loan
rate rL as determined in the market, where it is set to maximize borrower surplus. Given this,
the equilibrium loan rate will often not coincide with the loan rate that maximizes social
welfare, as borrowers prefer a loan rate that allocates them a greater fraction of the surplus
than is socially optimal. Specifically, even though the regulator would prefer to use the loan
rate to provide banks with incentives — it is a transfer that does not affect directly the level
of social welfare — in its choice of kreg, the regulator has to take into account how the market
solution for rL affects banks’ incentives to monitor. This can imply a different solution than
in the market case. Ideally, the regulator would like to be able to affect the competitive
environment. In particular, the regulator would like to reduce competition between banks
and have a higher loan rate to obtain the correct incentives. In what follows we assume it
is not possible for the regulator to interfere in the market mechanism and thus set the loan
rate. If it was possible, then this form of intervention would be superior to simply having
higher capital requirements.
In Region A.1 of Proposition 2, projects are so profitable that the equilibrium loan rate
rL = 2 is sufficient to provide banks with incentives to fully monitor even if they hold no
capital. The regulator therefore sets kreg = 0, the loan rate is set just equal to the level that
guarantees q = 1, and both banks and borrowers earn positive returns.
As the project return R falls below 2, the loan rate by itself is no longer enough to
support full monitoring (q = 1) without capital. The regulator then has a choice between
(a) keeping the capital requirement low and rL as high as possible, but recognizing that
monitoring may be reduced; or (b) requiring that banks hold more capital so as to maintain
complete monitoring. In the first case, the regulator sets the level of capital such that the
market maximizes borrower surplus by setting rL equal to R. Any lower level of rL leads to
monitoring by the bank that is insufficient to ensure depositors receive their opportunity cost;
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depositors will then not lend. Any higher level of rL violates the borrowers’ participation
constraint. This solution is optimal in Region A.2 of Proposition 2.
In the second case, the regulator uses a high level of capital to ensure that banks have
the correct incentives to monitor. The market then lowers rL so that borrower surplus is
made as large as possible. The limit to this process is set by the participation constraint of
the banks. In equilibrium rL is set so that the banks earn zero profits and borrowers capture
the entire surplus. This solution is optimal in Region B of Proposition 2. The boundary
R = RAB is where the two types of solution give the same level of social welfare. Finally,
as in the market solution, as the project return falls below R = 2− 1
2rE
, we enter Region C
where there is no intermediation.
We now turn to the comparison between the market and the regulatory solutions in the
case of a competitive credit market. We have the following immediate result.
Proposition 3 In the case of no deposit insurance:
A. For R ≥ RAB the market solution entails a higher level of capital than the regulatory
solution, kBS > kreg;
B. For 2− 1
2rE
≤ R < RAB, the market and the regulatory solutions entail the same level
of capital, kBS = kreg.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 (note that Region A comprises A.1 and A.2 from Propo-
sition 2). The results show that the market solution is inefficient as it induces banks to hold
inefficiently high levels of capital when the return of the project is sufficiently high. The
basic intuition is that whereas the regulator prefers to economize on the use of costly capital
and provide incentives through the loan rate, the market prefers to use capital as long as this
is consistent with banks’ participation constraint. This implies that banks always break even
in the market solution (Π = 0), while they make positive profits in the regulatory solution
in Regions A.1 and A.2 of Proposition 2. As the project return falls below RAB and banks
break even in the regulatory solution, the market solution coincides with the regulatory one
and the market equilibrium is constrained efficient.
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These results show that competition in the credit markets induces banks to make use of
capital despite it being a costly form of finance. A social welfare maximizing regulator may
find it optimal not to impose such high levels of capital and rather fix capital to the level
that induces banks to maximize the use of the loan rate as an incentive tool. When this
occurs, the market solution involves a higher level of capital than the regulatory solution.
Otherwise the market and the regulatory solutions coincide so that the market solution is
constrained efficient. One important feature of our analysis is that the regulator cannot set
the loan rate. If it could do so, it would always set rL equal to the project return so as to
minimize the need for costly capital.
It is important to note that our analysis has focused on one aspect of regulation. In
practice there are many other considerations driving capital regulation and minimum capital
requirements. These include asset substitution where banks have an incentive to reduce safe
investments and increase risky ones and systemic risk. These problems tend to be more
severe the more competitive is the environment. The effect of these considerations would
likely be to increase regulatory levels of capital.
4 Deposit Insurance
The standard argument concerning deposit insurance is that it makes funds more easily
available to banks and this accentuates the banks’ moral hazard problem. Capital regulation
is then required to offset the increased moral hazard problem. The purpose of this section
is to investigate this argument in the context of our model.
We start by considering how a perfectly competitive market operates when there is deposit
insurance and no capital regulation. As before, the market sets k and rL to maximize
borrower surplus, taking into account the subsequent monitoring choice and the fact that the
bank has to make non-negative profits. In contrast to the previous section, the government
now guarantees deposits in that it pays rD to the depositors if the bank goes bankrupt. We
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assume the cost of this deposit insurance is paid from revenues raised by non-distortionary
lump sum taxes. The amount that banks promise to pay depositors is therefore just rD = 1.
Solving the maximization problem (4) without the constraint (6) and setting rD = 1
gives the following result.
Proposition 4 In the case of deposit insurance, the market equilibrium always involves
rL < R so BS > 0, and Π = 0. The level of capital, loan rate, and monitoring are as
follows:
A. For R ≥ RAB, kBS = 12rE , rL = 2−
1
2rE
, q = 1, and BS = SW = R− (2− 1
2rE
);
B. For R < RAB, kBS =
µ√
2rE−
√
2rE−3(R−1)
3
¶2
< 1
2rE
, rL = 1 − kBS +
√
2rEkBS,
q =
√
2rEkBS < 1, BS = q(R − 1 + kBS − q), and SW = qR − q2 − (1 − kBS) T 0 for
R T min{RAB, bR}, where bR solves SW ( bR) = q bR− q2 − (1− kBS) = 0.
The boundary RAB is defined as RAB = 32 −
3
8rE
+ rE
2
for rE < 32 and RAB = 3−
3
2rE
for
rE ≥ 32 .
Proof: See the Appendix. ¤
The results in Proposition 4 again highlight the incentive mechanisms for bank moni-
toring that are used in a competitive credit market. As usual, borrowers prefer that banks
charge lower interest rates and hold large amounts of capital, whereas banks prefer to min-
imize the use of capital and receive incentives through a higher loan rate. Given that the
market solution maximizes borrower surplus, the equilibrium involves the maximum amount
of capital consistent with banks’ participation constraint and provides a loan rate up to the
point where the (marginal) positive incentive effect of a higher loan rate equals its negative
direct effect on borrower surplus. Thus, in addition to capital, the loan rate is still used to
provide monitoring incentives - and thus market discipline - from the asset side. However,
the market solution may now entail lower levels of monitoring and capital relative to the
case without deposit insurance.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 3. In both regions the zero-profit constraint for
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banks binds. If it did not, it would always be possible to increase BS by lowering rL and
increasing k while holding q constant. The exact amounts of monitoring and capital in
equilibrium depend on the project return R and on the cost of capital rE. In Region A,
project returns are high relative to rE so it is worth setting a high rL and k to ensure full
monitoring. As the returns fall in Region B, both rL and k are reduced and q < 1.
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that, differently from the case without deposit
insurance, intermediation is now always feasible. The reason is that since the cost of raising
deposits is fixed at rD = 1 but they are repaid by the bank only in the case of project
success, it is always possible to create positive borrower surplus and satisfy the zero profit
constraint. However, social welfare is negative for low enough R because of the cost of
repaying depositors when the bank fails. This means that there would be no intermediation
in this region if the institution insuring depositors refused to provide the insurance.
Following the same structure as before, we now analyze the optimal choice of capital from
a social welfare perspective when loan rates are set as part of a market solution to maximize
borrower surplus. The solution to this gives the following result.
Proposition 5 In the case of deposit insurance, the regulatory equilibrium is as follows:
A. kreg = 0, rL = R+12 , q = 1, BS > 0, Π > 0, and SW > 0;
B. kreg = 3−R, rL = R− 1, q = 1, BS > 0, Π > 0, and SW > 0;
C. kreg = R+1− 4(rE − 1), rL = 2(rE − 1), q = R− 2(rE − 1) < 1, BS > 0, Π > 0, and
SW > 0;
D. kreg = 0, rL = R2 , q =
R−1
2
< 1, BS > 0, Π > 0, and SW > 0;
E. kreg = 1
2rE
, rL = 2− 12rE , q = 1, BS = SW > 0, and Π = 0;
F. There is no intermediation because SW < 0.
The boundaries defining Regions A through F are shown in Figure 4 and, together with
the expressions for BS, Π, and SW , are defined in the Appendix.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¤
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Proposition 5 is illustrated in Figure 4. As usual, both capital and the loan rate are
used to provide monitoring incentives, and their exact amounts depend on the return of
the project R and the cost of equity rE. In Region A, R is sufficiently large so that it is
possible for the regulator to set kreg = 0 and still have full monitoring, with incentives being
provided by the loan rate rL. Both profits and borrower surplus are positive in this region.
For lower R, in Region B, borrowers prefer to reduce rL, thus providing lower incentives
through the interest rate. Since rE is relatively low, the regulator chooses a positive level of
capital, kreg > 0, to provide the remaining incentives to monitor. In Region C, the regulator
uses less capital since rE is higher, and it is no longer optimal to provide full incentives to
monitor, so that q < 1. In Region D, capital is too expensive to be worth using to provide
incentives to monitor and imperfect incentives are provided through rL alone. In Region E,
the regulator uses capital to make up for low incentives provided by a low value of rL. In
Region F, there is no intermediation since social welfare is negative. The regulator could
prevent intermediation by eliminating the provision of deposit insurance or by setting kreg
sufficiently high that banks’ participation constraint is violated.
We next compare the market and regulatory solutions. The comparison between the
values of kBS and kreg leads to the following result.
Proposition 6 With deposit insurance, the comparison between the market and the regula-
tory solutions is as follows:
A. kBS > kreg;
B. kBS = kreg;
C. kBS < kreg.
D. No intermediation with regulation.
Proof: See the Appendix. ¤
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 5. The main result of the proposition is that even
with deposit insurance the market solution entails a positive level of capital because of
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competition in the credit market. As in the case without deposit insurance, the market
solution entails too much capital (Region A) or is constrained efficient (Region B). The
inefficient use of capital arises because, as before, borrowers are always better off with lower
rL and higher capital as long as this is consistent with banks’ participation constraint. The
regulator, on the other hand, prefers to use a lower level of capital and provides incentives
through a higher interest rate, particularly when the project return R is high. As R falls,
the market solution becomes constrained efficient. Differently from the case without deposit
insurance, there is now also a small area (Region C) where the market solution entails a
lower level of capital than the regulatory solution. As the return R falls even further, the
regulatory solution is no longer viable as the regulator prefers not to have intermediation
when this implies negative social welfare.
Overall, the main conclusions of Section 3 remain valid when there is deposit insurance.
The basic tendency when credit markets are competitive is for banks to hold a positive
level of capital, sometimes even above the level that maximizes social welfare. However,
deposit insurance blunts monitoring incentives and thus more capital must be used to provide
incentives. This can be easily seen by comparing Propositions 3 and 6. The presence of
deposit insurance implies an upward shifting in the boundaries defining the regions. For
example, the boundary for kBS > kreg now lies entirely above the line R = 2, whereas
without deposit insurance it lies below R = 2. Similarly, the boundary for the region where
kBS = kreg in Figure 5 for the case of deposit insurance lies above the same boundary in
Figure 2 for the case without deposit insurance.
5 Extensions
In this section we extend our basic model in various directions. First, we analyze alternative
market structures to perfect competition. Second, in relation to banks’ ability to generate
rents, we study the case where banks have a franchise value from continuing to operate.
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Third, we analyze a classic asset substitution problem where banks can choose loans with a
lower probability of success but with a higher payoff in the case of success. This extension
can be used to obtain insight on the role of capital in the context of relationship versus trans-
actional lending. Fourth, we consider an alternative framework where the borrower exerts
effort and monitoring helps alleviate the resulting entrepreneurial moral hazard. Finally, we
discuss the case of fairly priced deposit insurance.
5.1 Alternative market structures
The analysis above has been conducted assuming that credit markets are competitive. Here,
we relax this assumption and consider the case where a bank operates as a monopolist and
can therefore appropriate the surplus generated by the investment projects.5
When a bank is a monopolist, the contract it offers borrowers is set to maximize the
bank’s profit, Π = q(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE − 12q2, subject to constraints (5) and (9) as well
as (8) to guarantee that borrowers are willing to participate. As with competition, there are
again the two cases of no deposit insurance and deposit insurance. In both it can be shown
that the bank maximizes its surplus by setting the highest interest rate possible, rL = R,
which gives it a relatively high incentive to monitor.
In the case of no deposit insurance, the constraint (6), that is qrD = 1, must again
be satisfied. Since the bank internalizes fully the entire benefit from monitoring as well as
the cost associated with non-repayment of depositors, it will always have the appropriate
incentives to monitor efficiently. The liability-side discipline exerted by depositors induces
banks to keep a positive amount of capital in situations where it is needed. There is therefore
no scope for capital regulation to improve welfare, as social welfare maximization coincides
with the maximization of bank profits and the market solution is always constrained efficient.
By contrast, a monopolist bank would never hold any capital in the market solution
when there is deposit insurance. Since the deposit rate becomes independent of the level
5See Allen et al. (2008) for a full analysis of the monopoly case.
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of bank monitoring, the bank has no incentive to use capital to commit to monitor. Given
this, the presence of deposit insurance may give a role to capital regulation as a way of
providing the bank with incentives to monitor and of reducing the disbursement of the
deposit insurance fund as in, for example, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo
(2004), and Morrison and White (2005). The solution that maximizes social welfare (given
a market-determined loan rate) requires that banks hold a positive level of capital whenever
the social benefit in terms of increased monitoring incentives and lower costs for the deposit
insurance fund outweigh the cost of raising capital. Capital regulation is therefore a second
best solution to the distortion introduced by deposit insurance when credit markets are
monopolistic. This is entirely due to the presence of deposit insurance, which allows the
bank to take advantage of the implicit subsidy it provides.
It is worth noting that, as with perfect competition, intermediation is sometimes not
feasible under monopoly. With no deposit insurance, there is no intermediation when project
payoffs are sufficiently low. The boundary for the no intermediation region in the market
solution, R < 2− 1
2rE
, coincides not only with that for the regulatory solution but also with
that under competition. Essentially, with no deposit insurance there is no intermediation
whenever it is socially inefficient, both under monopoly as well as under competition.
The case with deposit insurance is somewhat different. Since neither banks nor borrowers
bear the cost of repaying depositors when projects fail, financing is always available in
the market solution. By contrast, there is no intermediation with regulation when project
payoffs are sufficiently low. Now, however, there is a difference between the monopoly
and the competition case discussed above. With deposit insurance in the monopoly case,
intermediation is sometimes feasible even when not feasible without deposit insurance or
under competition. This occurs when the project return R is between
√
3 and 2 − 1
2rE
, or
equivalently, when the cost of capital rE is sufficiently high relative to the project’s payoff R.
The reason for this is that when capital is relatively costly, deposit insurance may be a more
economical way of offering repayment to depositors than forcing banks to raise more capital
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in order to commit to monitor more. There may therefore be projects that are sufficiently
profitable (i.e., for which R >
√
3) that are worth financing when deposit insurance is in
place and banks are monopolists, but would not be worth financing (i.e., projects for which
R < 2 − 1
2rE
) in the absence of deposit insurance or when markets are competitive. In
this sense, deposit insurance may increase social welfare and expand the possibilities for
intermediation with monopolistic credit markets.6 This result is related to Morrison and
White (2006) in that deposit insurance helps correct a market failure and expands markets.
The analysis so far has focused on the extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly.
With perfect competition, borrower surplus is maximized and capital is used in the market
solution to provide incentives for banks to monitor. Because capital is costly, competition can
lead to inefficiencies. In the monopoly case, the contract maximizes the bank’s profit and the
bank gets the surplus. The high surplus provides banks with incentives to monitor efficiently
with little or no capital. With intermediate market structures, surplus is split between banks
and borrowers, with each obtaining a positive expected return. The effects identified above
will remain in such cases. In particular, the more surplus that banks obtain the less capital
they will use. The more surplus borrowers obtain the greater will be the tendency for banks
to use capital. These arguments also suggest that when capital regulation is too costly
or ineffective as may be the case in our model in competitive credit markets, the regulator
could seek to reduce interbank competition so as to provide banks with incentives to monitor
through a higher loan rate instead of higher capital.
5.2 Bank franchise value
Together with the market structure, much discussion of bank behavior has focused on the
role of franchise value as a possible way to reduce risk-taking [e.g., Keeley (1990)]. Franchise
value acts as an additional instrument providing a commitment to monitor. The intuition is
6Of course, this positive result on the role of deposit insurance relies also on the fact that we have assumed
that deposit insurance is funded through general revenues raised by non-distortionary taxes. If distortionary
taxes were used, then the effective cost of deposit insurance would be higher.
22
simply that a greater franchise value means that the bank has a larger incentive to remain
viable and in business, which leads it to dedicate more resources to monitor its borrowers
so as to increase the success probability of its loans. As a consequence, the optimal level of
capital needed to provide monitoring incentives is lower than without franchise value.
We endogenize the franchise value by characterizing the equilibrium of the dynamic model
that is just a repeated version of our model. If a bank stays solvent, it is able to continue
to the next period. If it defaults, it goes out of business. Introducing a discount factor of δ
and a time index t for each period, the franchise value at date t, denoted by FVt, is given
by the current profits and the discounted value of the franchise value at date t+ 1 so:
FVt = Πt + qtδFVt+1 = qt(rLt − (1− kt)rDt)− ktrE −
1
2
q2t + qtδFVt+1.
The maximization of FVt leads to a monitoring effort at time t, qt, equal to:
qt = min{rLt − (1− kt)rDt + δFVt+1, 1}.
This implies that, for interior solutions, monitoring depends positively on the current returns
from monitoring as well as on the future expected rents as, for example, in Boot and Green-
baum (1993). Given the problem is the same in each period, the optimal solution must be
the same each period and thus FVt = FVt+1 = FV . Taking the interior solution for q and
eliminating the t indexing, we can then express FV as:
FV = q(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2 + qδFV,
from which
FV =
1
1− qδ
µ
q(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2
¶
=
1
1− qδΠ.
From this, it can be seen that the franchise value depends positively on the bank’s static
profit Π and equals zero whenever Π = 0. Thus, the role of the franchise value in reducing
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risk-taking depends crucially on the market structure of the credit market in that bank
profits will usually be higher in monopolistic markets than in competitive markets. It may
also depend on the presence or absence of capital regulation since, as shown above, optimal
capital regulation may entail setting a capital requirement that provides banks with rents,
even when the market is competitive.
5.3 Relationship and transactional lending
We have assumed throughout that banks can only finance projects that benefit from mon-
itoring. In that context, we have shown that capital plays a role as a commitment device
for banks to monitor and thus attract borrowers. We now modify this basic framework and,
similarly to Boot and Thakor (2000), we consider the case where banks can choose between
investing in a project that is identical to the one studied so far, and an alternative project
with a fixed probability pT of returning a payoff RT . We will refer to the first kind of loan
as a “relationship” loan since it benefits from the interaction with the bank, and the latter
loan as a “transactional” loan. The crucial difference is that bank monitoring affects only
the success probability of the relationship loan, given as before by q. As a consequence, the
bank’s capital holdings will now affect the relative attractiveness of the two projects and
capital regulation will play the additional role of affecting the distribution of bank funds
across projects.
Assume that pT < q(0) < 1, RT > R, and pTRT < q(0)R, where q(k) is the level of
monitoring for a relationship loan when the bank has capital k. The transactional project
has a lower probability of success than a relationship loan even with no capital (k = 0), a
higher payoff in case of success, but a lower expected payoff. These assumptions introduce the
possibility of a classic asset substitution problem. Banks may prefer to make transactional
loans even though relationship loans are more valuable socially. Capital regulation can help
to correct this market failure.
To analyze the bank’s choice in more detail, consider, for example, the case of monopoly
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banking where banks set the loan rate to obtain all the returns from the projects and have
expected profits equal to:
ΠR = q(R− (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2,
ΠT = pT (RT − (1− k)rD)− krE,
from the relationship and the transactional loans, respectively. We first note that ∂ΠT
∂k
=
pT rD − rE < 0 so that capital decreases the attractiveness of the transactional loan and
the bank would not want to hold any capital when investing in this project. This implies
that capital regulation has the additional role of affecting the distribution of funds towards
socially valuable investment projects. In situations where the asset substitution problem
leads to an inefficiency, a minimum capital requirement can be used to rule out transactional
lending and ensure relationship lending. Such a requirement will need to be higher the higher
are RT and rD. Once this capital regulation is in place, the factors considered in the basic
model concerning relationship lending will come into play. Capital is further used to provide
monitoring incentives, and the qualitative results of our basic model remain valid.
5.4 The monitoring technology
So far we have assumed that bank monitoring directly determines the probability of success
of the investment project. This captures the idea of bank monitoring being desirable for
borrowers, and it simplifies the analysis in that the borrower does not exert any effort.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) use a different framework where bank monitoring reduces
borrowers’ private benefits. We adapt their approach so that monitoring influences the
project success probability only indirectly. Specifically, assume that the firm invests in a
project which, as before, yields a total payoff of R when successful and 0 when not. The
probability of success depends now on the effort of the borrower. In particular, the borrower
chooses an unobservable effort e ∈ [0, 1] that determines the probability of success of the
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project and carries a cost of e2/2. The borrower also enjoys a (nonpecuniary) private benefit
(1− e)B > 0, which is maximized when he exerts no effort. One way of interpreting the cost
−eB is that putting in effort reduces the amount of time the borrower can spend pursuing
privately beneficial activities, or enjoying the perks of being in charge of the project. Bank
monitoring helps alleviate moral hazard in this framework. In particular, the bank chooses
a monitoring effort q, which reduces the private benefit of the borrower to (1− e)B(1 − q)
and entails a cost of q2/2. We can think of bank monitoring as taking the form of using
accounting and other controls to reduce the borrower’s private effort, or to reduce his ability
to consume perks. Monitoring is chosen before the borrower’s effort.
Given this set up, for given k, rD, and rL, the borrower chooses his effort to maximize:
BS = e(R− rL) + (1− e)B(1− q)−
1
2
e2
so that:
e = min {(R− rL)−B(1− q), 1} .
The bank chooses q to maximize:
Π = e(rL − (1− k)rD)− krE −
1
2
q2,
which yields:
q = min {(rL − (1− k)rD)B, 1} .
It can be seen that in this version of the model, the borrower’s effort decreases with the
loan rate rL and the private benefit B while it increases with the project return R and the
monitoring effort q. Bank monitoring in turn increases in the loan rate rL, the level of capital
k, and the private benefit B. Thus, as before, bank monitoring positively affects the success
probability of the project as it reduces borrower’s moral hazard. The difference is that, as
in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), in setting the loan rate rL the bank will now have to consider
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also the negative effect that this has on the borrower’s effort so that in equilibrium its level
generally will be lower than the one found in our basic model. This also implies different
levels of capital and of monitoring in equilibrium relative to those in our basic model, but
it does not affect the qualitative results as long as the loan rate rL is still used to provide
banks with incentives to monitor, which is desirable from the borrower’s perspective. A
sufficient condition to guarantee this is that the private benefit B is greater than one, as this
implies that the indirect positive effect through a higher q of an increase in rL dominates
the negative direct effect on the entrepreneur’s effort e.
5.5 Fairly priced deposit insurance
We have shown above that deposit insurance accentuates banks’ moral hazard problem in
monitoring as deposit rates become insensitive to the risk of banks’ assets. In doing this,
we have assumed that the cost of deposit insurance is paid from revenues raised by non-
distortionary lump sum taxes and it is therefore independent of banks’ risk and capital. We
now consider the case of fairly priced deposit insurance, which is the case where banks pay a
deposit insurance premium that reflects their default probability. We denote this cost as C
and, as is common in the literature [e.g., Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992)], we assume
that the bank pays it in advance.7 This implies that the bank needs to raise a total of 1+C
units of funds to finance the loan to the borrower, as well as to pay the insurance premium.
As usual, k of these funds represent capital, and 1−k+C is deposits. Given that the deposit
rate is still rD = 1 as deposits are fully insured, bank profits can be written as:
Π = q(rL − (1− k + C))− krE −
1
2
q2, (12)
reflecting the fact that all deposits, 1− k+C, are only repaid by the bank when its project
is successful.
7It can be shown that the same results hold if the bank pays the deposit insurance premium ex post from
the revenue derived from its loan.
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In order to be fairly priced, the premium C has to be equal to the expected future
disbursement of the deposit insurance fund. This equals 1−k+C upon default by the bank,
which in expectation is (1 − q) (1− k + C). Setting the payment equal to the expected
disbursement and solving for C we obtain:
C =
(1− q) (1− k)
q
.
Substituting this into (12) and simplifying gives the same expression for the bank’s profit,
Π = q(rL − (1 − k)1q ) − krE −
1
2
q2, as in the case of no deposit insurance. This implies
that the case of fairly priced deposit insurance delivers the same results as the case with no
deposit insurance. The intuition is that the fairly priced deposit insurance premium plays
the same role as the deposit rate in the case of no deposit insurance in terms of providing
“liability-side” discipline.
6 Empirical Predictions
The main insight of the paper is to show that competition in the credit market provides an
incentive for banks to use capital as a way to commit to greater monitoring. This is consistent
with the fact that banks voluntarily hold high levels of capital even above the regulatory
levels and that changes in capital regulation do not affect banks’ capital structures, as found
by Ashcraft (2001), Barrios and Blanco (2003), Alfon, Argimon, and Bascunana-Ambros
(2004), and Flannery and Rangan (2008).
According to our model, banks’ levels of capital vary with the degree of competition.
As explained above, with market structures intermediate between perfect competition and
monopoly, surplus is split between banks and borrowers, with each obtaining a positive
expected return. The more surplus that firms obtain, the more capital banks will use.
This suggests the empirical prediction that the more competitive is the banking sector, the
greater will capital holdings be. This prediction finds empirical support in Cihak and Schaeck
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(2008), who find that European banks hold higher capital ratios when operating in a more
competitive environment.
The mechanism that capital improves banks’ incentives to monitor leads to some cross-
sectional implications concerning banks’ capital holdings and firms’ source of borrowing. In
particular, it suggests that banks engaged in monitoring-intensive lending should be more
capitalized than other banks. To the extent that small banks are more involved in more
monitored lending to small and medium firms, the model predicts that small banks should
be better capitalized than larger banks, in line with the empirical findings in Alfon, Argimon,
and Bascunana-Ambros (2004), Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004), and Gropp and Heider
(2008).
Concerning firms’ choice of financing, our model predicts that firms for which monitoring
adds the most value should prefer to borrow from banks with high capital. Billett, Flannery,
and Garfinkel (1995) find that lender “identity,” in the sense of the lender’s credit rating, is
an important determinant of the market’s reaction to the announcement of a loan. To the
extent that capitalization improves a lender’s rating and reputation, these results are in line
with the predictions of our model.
Concerning the introduction of fixed rate deposit insurance, the model predicts that
banks’ capital will fall. As a result, their monitoring efforts will be reduced and risk will
increase. This result is consistent with the finding in most empirical studies considering
whether deposit insurance increases the riskiness of banks [e.g., Ioannidou and Penas (2009)].
Our analysis also has some implications concerning banks’ portfolio choice. As shown
earlier, capital decreases the attractiveness of transactional loans while increasing that of
relationship loans. Thus, anything that induces banks to hold more capital affects the
allocation of banks’ funds. This implies that increased competition or increased capital
requirements should be associated with a shift in banks’ portfolios away from transactional
lending towards more relationship lending. Similarly, the presence of capital markets reduces
banks’ incentives to hold capital, as found empirically by Cihak and Schaeck (2008), and
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consequently should be associated with higher transactional lending. These predictions are
consistent with the theoretical results in Boot and Thakor (2000) that stronger interbank
competition and weaker capital market competition should induce more relationship lending.
Our model also has implications for the penetration of banks into foreign markets. Among
other things, information asymmetries developed through long-term relationships have been
identified as possible barriers to entry. This leads banks to focus their entry toward market
segments less subject to private information [see Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), and Mar-
quez (2002), and the evidence in Clarke, Cull, D’Amato and Molinari (2001), and Martinez-
Peria and Mody (2004)]. These results point to the need for entrant banks to have a com-
petitive edge. Capital provides banks with an advantage in attracting borrowers as it allows
them to commit to monitor. Our analysis thus predicts that it will be well-capitalized banks
that enter foreign markets.
In our model, there is no agency problem either within the bank or the firm. Introducing
an agency problem within the bank may reduce the role of capital as a way to commit to
greater monitoring, as in Besanko and Kanatas (1996), where raising equity dilutes current
managers’ stake in the firm and thus reduces their incentives to exert effort. This suggests
that our analysis applies to banks where the agency problem is limited because of a small
share of outside equity or to countries where the interests of insider and outsider investors are
aligned through a range of contractual provisions. In this respect, our model predicts that
banks with a lower fraction of outside equity or in countries with stronger shareholder rights
should be more capitalized than banks with more dispersed ownership. This prediction is
consistent with the empirical finding in Cihak and Schaeck (2008) of a positive relationship
between shareholder rights and banks’ capital holdings. Finally, introducing an effort re-
quirement in the borrowing firm as in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) reduces the attractiveness
of the loan rate as an incentive tool and increases the importance of capital. To the extent
that small and medium firms are more subject to an effort requirement, banks lending to
them will use more capital. This is consistent with the evidence in Alfon, Argimon, and
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Bascunana-Ambros (2004), Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004), and Gropp and Heider (2008)
mentioned above.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of capital that is consistent with the observation
that banks may hold levels of capital even above the levels required by regulation. Our
approach is based on the idea that both the loan rate charged by the bank and capital
provide incentives to monitor, and that competition in the credit market may operate as
market discipline from the asset side of banks’s balance sheets. We adopt the standard
assumption in the literature that capital is more costly than other sources of funds. In the
case of no deposit insurance, a competitive market structure provides incentives for banks
to use a positive level of capital. The reason is that borrowers prefer lower interest rates and
higher capital as they do not bear the cost of the capital. When there is deposit insurance,
banks’ incentives to monitor are reduced, but the market solution may still entail too much
capital. However, banks now use too little capital for a small range of parameters.
There are many interesting directions for future research. First, the fact that banks hold
levels of capital above the regulatory minimum does not necessarily imply that they are well
capitalized. Although in our model excess capital implies levels above those maximizing social
welfare, in more complex models reflecting other important aspects of capital requirements
banks may still be undercapitalized despite them holding capital well above the regulatory
minimum. This is a particularly important line of research given the current crisis in the
financial system and the discussion of whether banks were indeed adequately capitalized.
For example, we disregard sources of systemic risk. In our model banks are subject only to
idiosyncratic individual risk because of the possibility that their loans do not repay. The
failure of one bank does not have any spillover on the other banks. If it did, there would
be an additional role for capital regulation. The market solution would not internalize this
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contagion risk when setting the level of capital banks should hold. By contrast, a social
welfare maximizing regulator would internalize this risk and would therefore require banks
to hold higher levels of capital than the ones obtained in our model.
Second, in our model we assume that all banks are the same. Boot and Marinc̆ (2006)
consider heterogeneous banks with a fixed cost of monitoring operating in markets with
different degrees of competition. Incorporating these elements into our framework could be
an interesting direction to pursue in the future.
We have focused on regulatory capital that maximizes social welfare. A number of other
approaches are possible. For example, in many instances it seems that actual regulatory
capital levels have been set based on historically observed levels. Basel II represents another
type of approach where regulatory capital is derived from the criterion of covering the bank’s
losses 99.9% of the time. The discrete version of the model we have developed is not appro-
priate for analyzing this type of criterion. Instead, a version with a continuous distribution
of returns is necessary. Developing this extension of our model is another interesting topic
for future research. This would also help shed light on the question as to whether banks can
be undercapitalized even whey hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum.
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A Proofs
Full details of the algebra in the proofs are given in Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2008).
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting (6) into (5) when q < 1 and solving for the equilib-
rium value of monitoring, we obtain two solutions as given by q = 1
2
³
rL ±
p
r2L − 4 (1− k)
´
.
The relevant solution is the positive root, as it can be shown that both banks and borrowers
are better off with the higher level of monitoring. This implies that:
q = min
½
1
2
µ
rL +
q
r2L − 4 (1− k)
¶
, 1
¾
. (A1)
Assuming q < 1, we substitute for q in the expression for borrower surplus to obtain
BS = q(R − rL) = 12
³
rL +
p
r2L − 4 (1− k)
´
(R − rL). Clearly, we need rL ≥ 2
√
1− k for
an equilibrium to exist.
We now turn to the determination of rL and k. It can be shown that Π > 0 is never
optimal. For each of the four possible combinations of q ≤ 1 and k ≤ 1, it is either possible
to increase BS by changing q, k, and rL appropriately (q, k < 1; q = 1, k < 1; q = k = 1) or
the bank’s participation constraint is violated (q < 1, k = 1).
Given Π = 0, consider now a candidate solution for the optimum with q = 1. From
Π = rL − 32 + k (1− rE) = 0, we obtain rL =
3
2
+ k (rE − 1). For rL to be optimal for
borrowers, k must be the lowest value consistent with q = 1. Substituting the expression for
rL into (A1), setting this equal to one and solving for k gives k = 12rE . With this value for k,
the expression for rL gives rL = 2− 12rE . Note that, given our candidate solution has q = 1,
no other solution can increase BS while satisfying the bank’s participation constraint. For
k > 1
2rE
, rL > 2 − 12rE , but q does not increase beyond 1, thus lowering BS. For k <
1
2rE
,
satisfying the bank’s participation constraint with equality requires reducing rL. This lowers
q to below 1, violating the assumption that q = 1 at the optimum. Note further that for
q = 1, BS = R−
³
2− 1
2rE
´
, which is clearly greater than zero only for R > 2− 1
2rE
.
It remains to be shown that at the optimum, q = 1 must hold. To see this, substitute
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the expression for q < 1 from (A1) into Π(q). Solving simultaneously for k and rL gives:
k =
q2
2rE
, rL = q +
1
q
− q
2rE
.
We can now substitute these expressions into the problem of maximizing borrower surplus
with the maximization now taken with respect to q: maxq BS = q
³
R− q − 1
q
+ q
2rE
´
=
qR− q2 − 1 + q2
2rE
. The derivative yields:
∂BS
∂q
= R− 2q + q
rE
, (A2)
with the second derivative being negative so that BS is concave in q. Note now that
∂BS
∂q
¯̄̄
q=0
= R > 0, so that clearly q > 0 is optimal. Setting (A2) equal to zero and solving for
q, we obtain q∗ = R/(2− 1
rE
). From this we see that for R > 2− 1
2rE
> 2− 1
rE
, q∗ > 1, so that
the solution must have q = 1. Moreover, from above we know that for q = 1, BS = SW ≥ 0
for R ≥ 2− 1
2rE
. This gives Region A of the proposition.
Finally, consider the case where R < 2 − 1
2rE
. For 2 − 1
2rE
> R ≥ 2 − 1
rE
, q = 1 and
BS < 0. For R < 2 − 1
rE
, q < 1. Substituting the optimal value of q into BS it can be
shown that BS = q2
³
1− 1
2rE
´
− 1 < 0 since q = R/(2− 1
rE
) < 1. Thus for R < 2− 1
2rE
, no
intermediation is possible. This gives Region B of the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: As before, the equilibrium value of monitoring q is given by (A1)
and rL ≥ 2
√
1− k is needed for an equilibrium to exist when q < 1. Assuming that rL is
large enough, we can show that the unique solution that satisfies (11) is:
brL ≡ R
2
+
2 (1− k)
R
. (A3)
For rL → 2
√
1− k, ∂BS/∂rL > 0. Substituting rL = brL+ε into ∂BS/∂rL and evaluating for
ε > 0 by differentiating with respect to ε, it can be shown that ∂BS/∂rL < 0 for rL > brL. It
follows from this that BS(rL) is a concave function in the relevant range.
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Note also that for rL ≥ rL ≡ 2 − k ≥ 2
√
1− k, it follows from (A1) that q = 1 and for
rL < rL, q < 1.
We now divide the analysis into two cases: (1) R ≥ 2; and (2) R < 2.
Case 1: R ≥ 2. Now brL > rL for R > 2. To see this note that brL = rL at R = 2 and
∂(brL − rL)/∂R = 12 − 2(1− k)/R2 > 0 for R > 2. Given the concavity of BS(rL), it follows
that ∂BS
∂rL
¯̄̄
rL
> 0 for R > 2. This implies that borrowers always demand a loan rate equal to
rL = rL = 2 − k so that q = 1 as long as this satisfies the bank’s participation constraint,
Π = 1
2
− krE ≥ 0, which it does for k ≤ 12rE . For k >
1
2rE
such that the bank’s participation
constraint binds, we need to set rL to satisfy Π (rL|k) = 0.
Assuming the bank’s participation constraint is satisfied, we can now turn to the problem
in the first stage to determine k. Since q = 1, the problem simplifies to:
max
k
SW = R− 3
2
+ k (1− rE) .
The first-order condition yields ∂SW/∂k = 1 − rE < 0, so that k = 0 is optimal. We
check that this solution does in fact satisfy the bank’s participation constraint, as Π =
qrL − (1 − k) − krE − 12q2 = 2 − k − (1 − k) − krE −
1
2
= 1
2
> 0. Therefore, k = 0, q = 1,
and rL = 2 is a candidate solution for R ≥ 2. That it is also the optimal solution can be
seen from noting that higher values of k cannot increase q further, so that any solution with
k > 1
2rE
and rL determined from Π (rL|k) = 0 when the bank’s participation constraint binds
must necessarily lead to lower SW .
Case 2: R < 2. We know that a minimum condition for an equilibrium to exist is that
rL ≥ 2
√
1− k. Solving for k, this is equivalent to requiring k ≥ 1− r2L/4. For rL = R, this
implies kmin = 1−R2/4 as an absolute lower bound on the level of capital that is consistent
with equilibrium.
Using the expressions for brL and rL, substituting for kminand rearranging gives brL− rL =
−(1− R
2
)2 < 0. It follows that for R < 2, brL < rL and from (A1) that q(brL) < 1.
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Define now rBL as the loan rate that satisfies the bank’s participation constraint with
equality, that is Π(rBL |k) = 0. Also, note that ∂Π∂rL = (rL − q)
∂q
∂rL
+ q > 0. If, for a given k,
brL > rBL , then at the optimum borrowers choose rL = brL, and q < 1, Π > 0. If, however, for
a given k, brL < rBL , then brL is no longer a feasible solution since Π (brL) < Π ¡rBL ¢ = 0. In this
case, the optimal loan rate is the lowest rate for which Π = 0, which is rBL . This is because
no lower rate is feasible since Π (rL) < 0 for any rL < rBL . A higher rL is feasible but not
optimal since it follows from the concavity of BS that BS must be decreasing for rL > brL.
The analysis above demonstrates that we have two candidate solutions: either rL = rBL
with Π
¡
rBL
¢
= 0, or rL = brL with Π (brL) ≥ 0. The level of k chosen by the regulator
remains to be determined for the two solutions. Start with the case where rL = rBL , so that
Π
¡
rBL
¢
= 0. Here, the maximization of SW is equivalent to the maximization of BS, for
which we know from Proposition 1 that the solution involves q = 1 and rL = 2 − k. This
implies Π = 1
2
− krE, and since by assumption we have Π = 0, this implies that k = 12rE at
the optimum. Under this solution, social welfare equals:
SW1 = qR− (1− k)− krE −
1
2
q2 = R− 3
2
+
1
2rE
(1− rE) = R− 2 +
1
2rE
.
We note that SW1 ≥ 0 for R ≥ 2− 12rE .
Next, consider the candidate loan rate rL = brL = R2 + 2(1−k)R , with q < 1. For this solution
to be feasible, it must satisfy Π ≥ 0. Substituting the equilibrium loan rate into the bank’s
monitoring effort as in (A1), we have q = R/2.
Consider now social welfare, and note that ∂SW
∂k
= 1 − rE < 0, so that the regulator
prefers the lowest possible k. From above, this lowest value is given by k = 1 − R2
4
. Now
brL = R when evaluated at k = 1− R24 . For this level of k and rL, BS = 0. However, q = R/2,
which implies:
SW2 = Π =
R2
8
− (1− R
2
4
)rE.
We compare the two candidate solutions. This amounts to finding the minimum value of
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R such that SW2 ≥ SW1. This value is given by:
RAB =
4rE + 2
p
rE + 2r2E − 6r3E + 4r4E
rE + 2r2E
,
so that, for R > RAB, SW is maximized by setting k = 1 − R
2
4
, with q = R
2
, rL = R, and
Π = SW > 0. This is Region A.2 in Proposition 2. For R < RAB, SW is maximized by
setting k = 1
2rE
, with q = 1, rL = 2− k, Π = 0 and SW = R− 2+ 12rE . This is part B of the
proposition.
Finally, if R−2+ 1
2rE
< 0 no intermediation occurs and this is part C of the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4: With deposit insurance rD = 1, and (2) simplifies to q =
min {rL − (1− k), 1} .
We then proceed in two steps. The first is to show that at the optimum k < 1, rL < R
and Π = 0. The second is to characterize Regions A and B of the proposition (see Figure 3).
Step 1 : To demonstrate that k = 1 is not optimal, assume that k = 1. Then it is possible
to increase BS both for q = 1 and q < 1 by appropriately changing k and rL. Similarly, it
is possible to show that rL = R cannot be optimal because it is always possible to lower rL
and set k so that q > 0 and BS is increased. Finally, it can be shown that if Π > 0 it is
always possible to alter k and rL so that BS is increased.
Step 2 : We now turn to the expressions for k, rL, and q knowing that k < 1, rL < R,
and Π = 0. There are two possibilities for the monitoring effort, q = 1 and q < 1, and these
correspond to Regions A and B in the proposition.
Consider q < 1 first. This implies q = rL − (1 − k) < 1. Using this and the constraint
Π = 0, we have:
rL = 1− k +
p
2rEk and q =
p
2rEk < 1. (A4)
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The last inequality implies k < k = 1
2rE
for q < 1. Given (A4), it follows that:
BS(k) =
p
2rEk[R− 1 + k −
p
2rEk]. (A5)
Differentiating with respect to k, putting ∂BS
∂k
= 0, multiplying through by k1/2, solving for
k1/2 and squaring, we obtain k =
³
[
√
2rE ±
p
2rE − 3(R− 1)]/3
´2
. This gives two distinct
roots for 2rE−3(R−1) > 0 or, equivalently, R < 2rE3 +1. Since BS|k=0 = 0 and
∂BS
∂k
¯̄
k=0
> 0,
the root for k with a minus, kINT , is a local maximum while the root with a plus, kMIN , is a
local minimum. To see then whether kINT is a global maximum, we first note that k = 1
2rE
is the maximum possible optimal value of k since for k > 1
2rE
, q = 1, BS = R − rL with
rL = 3/2+ k(rE − 1) satisfying the constraint Π = 0, and ∂BS/∂k = −(rE − 1) < 0, so that
k > k is never optimal for borrowers. Then, we compare kINT and kMIN with k. To do this,
we distinguish between two cases given by rE > 32 and rE ≤
3
2
.
(i) Consider rE > 32 . Setting k
INT = k and solving for R yields R = RAB = 3 − 32rE .
Since kINT is increasing in R, this implies that kINT < k for R < 3− 3
2rE
. Now notice that
for rE > 32 we have:
k
1/2
=
1√
2rE
<
1√
3
<
1√
3
√
2rE√
3
=
√
2rE
3
.
This inequality together with
³√
2rE
3
´2
< kMIN implies k < kMIN . Thus, if rE > 32 , we have
kINT < k < kMIN for R < RAB. This, together with the fact that at q = 1, ∂BS/∂k < 0 and
that ∂BS
∂k
¯̄
k=k
= rE
³
R− 3 + 3
2rE
´
< 0, implies that BS(kINT ) > BS(k) and therefore that
kINT is the global maximum for R < RAB and rE > 32 . By contrast, for RAB < R <
2rE
3
+1,
kINT > k and k = 1
2rE
is the global optimum since q = 1, ∂BS
∂k
¯̄
k=k
> 0 and ∂BS/∂k =
−(rE − 1) < 0 for k > 12rE . Finally, for R >
2rE
3
+ 1, no real value for kINT exists. It follows
that for 0 ≤ k < 1
2rE
, ∂BS/∂k > 0, while ∂BS/∂k < 0 for k > 1
2rE
. Thus k = 1
2rE
is the
global maximum and q = 1.
(ii) Consider now rE < 32 . Here it can be shown similarly to above that k
1/2
>
√
2rE/3
so that kINT < k. Now kMIN = k for R = 3 − 3
2rE
, and kMIN > k for R < 3 − 3
2rE
since
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kMIN is decreasing in R. This implies that kINT is the global optimum for R ≤ 3 − 3
2rE
using a similar argument to the one above for rE > 32 . On the other hand, for R > 3−
3
2rE
,
kMIN < k and therefore BS(kINT ) could be higher or lower than BS(k). To see when
BS(kINT ) > BS(k), set them equal to each other and solve for R. Denoting this value by
RAB, we have RAB = 32 −
3
8rE
+ rE
2
. Then the global optimum is at k = kINT for R < RAB
and at k = k = 1
2rE
for R ≥ RAB.
Together (i) and (ii) give the boundary for Regions A and B of the proposition and the
values of kBS, rL, and q. In Region A, BS = SW = q(R− rL) = R− (2− 12rE ), and in part
B, BS = q(R− 1 + kBS − q), and SW = BS − (1− q)(1− kBS) = qR− q2 − (1− kBS).
Finally, consider the boundary where SW = 0, as illustrated in Figure 5. In Region
A, SW = R − (2 − 1
2rE
). Evaluating this at the boundary for Region A for rE < 32 , given
by RAB = 32 −
3
8rE
+ rE
2
, gives SW |RAB =
(1−2rE)2
8rE
> 0. This implies that social welfare is
positive at the boundary as well as above it. The same holds for rE ≥ 32 , since by evaluating
social welfare at RAB = 3− 32rE we obtain SW |RAB = 1−
1
rE
> 0.
Consider now social welfare in Region B, as given by SW = qR−q2−(1−kBS). Evaluating
this at RAB = 32 −
3
8rE
+ rE
2
for rE < 32 gives SW |RAB = [5− 46rE +44r
2
E − 8r3E]/16rE. This
equals zero at rE = 1.226, is negative for rE < 1.226 and positive for 1.226 ≤ rE < 1.5.
Consider now the case rE ≥ 32 . It can be checked that for rE ≥ 1.226 there exists a boundarybR as defined implicitly by SW = qR− q2− (1− kBS) = 0 such that SW ≥ 0 for R ≥ bR and
SW < 0 otherwise. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5: We proceed in two steps. We first describe how the optimal
amount of capital k is determined depending on which constraints bind. Then we find the
global optimum kREG as a function of the parameters R and rE.
Step 1. We start by determining the optimal amount of capital k depending on the
constraints Π ≥ 0 and q ≤ 1 in the maximization problem.
Case 1: Unconstrained case (Π > 0) for q < 1. If q = rL−(1−k) < 1, then from the first-
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order condition ∂BS/∂rL = 0, we have rL = [R+(1− k)]/2 so that q = [R− (1− k)]/2 < 1.
Substituting these expressions for q and rL into (10) gives:
SWU(k) = R
µ
R− (1− k)
2
¶
− (1− k)− krE −
1
2
µ
R− (1− k)
2
¶2
. (A6)
It can be easily checked that SWU is a concave function of k. Given this, there are three
possibilities for the optimal value of k when Π > 0:
(i) ∂SWU/∂k < 0, in which case k = 0 is optimal.
(ii) ∂SWU/∂k = 0, in which case there is an interior optimum given by kINTU = R+ 1−
4(rE − 1).
(iii) ∂SWU/∂k > 0, in which case the optimum is at the value k0 = 1 + 4rE − R −
4
√
rE
q
1
2
+ rE − 12R at which the constraint Π ≥ 0 is satisfied with equality or at the value
kU = 3 − R at which the constraint q ≤ 1 is satisfied with equality, depending on which is
the smallest.
Case 2: Constrained case (Π = 0) for q < 1. When Π = 0, as in (A4), we have rL =
1− k +
√
2rEk, and q =
√
2rEk. Substituting these into (10), the expression for SW , gives:
SWC(k) =
p
2rEkR− (1− k)− 2rEk. (A7)
Again SWC is a concave function of k but in this case ∂SWC∂k
¯̄
k=0
> 0. This implies that there
are two possibilities for the optimal value of k when Π = 0 and q < 1:
(i) ∂SWC/∂k = 0, so that there is an interior optimum given by kINTC = rER
2/[2(2rE −
1)2].
(ii) ∂SWC/∂k > 0, so that the optimum k is where the constraint q ≤ 1 starts to be
binding. From q = 1, this happens when k̄C = 12rE < 1 since rE ≥ 1.
The optimal value of k is at the smaller of k̄C or kINTC .
Case 3: Unconstrained case (Π > 0) for q = 1. From q = 1, it follows that rL = 2 − k.
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Substituting q = 1 into (10), we then have:
SWU1(k) = R− (1− k)− krE −
1
2
,
from which ∂SWU1/∂k = 1− rE < 0 as rE > 1. Thus, the only possible optimal value for k
when Π > 0 and q = 1 is at the value where the constraint q = 1 starts to be binding, which
occurs at k = kU = 3−R.
Case 4: Constrained case (Π = 0) for q = 1. Substituting q = 1 in the expression for SW
we obtain SWC1 = SWU1 = R− (1− k)− krE − 12 and thus ∂SWC1/∂k = 1− rE < 0. Then
the only possible optimum in this case is the lowest value of k such that Π = 0 and q = 1 as
given by kC = 1/2rE.
In determining the global optimum the potential values of k are 0, kU , k0, kINTU , k̄C or
kINTC . In fact it is possible to show that in all the regions where SW ≥ 0, k̄C < kINTC . This
will be done after considering all the regions and the other constraints.
Step 2. Now that we have derived the possible cases depending on the constraints Π ≥ 0
and q ≤ 1 and the optimal values of k in each of them, we analyze how the two constraints
move as a function of the parameters rE and R, and determine the global optimal value for
k in each scenario. The regions refer to those in Figure 4.
Region A: When R ≥ 3, the optimal solution is k = 0 in the unconstrained case (Π > 0)
with q = 1. From the expressions in Step 1 for the unconstrained region it can be seen that
with k = 0 and q = 1, rL = R+12 , BS =
1
2
(R− 1) > 0,Π = R
2
− 1 > 0, and SW = R− 3
2
> 0.
Region B: In this region, the global optimum is at k = k̄U = 3−R in the unconstrained
case (Π > 0) with q = 1. This requires:
k̄U ≤ k0, ∂SWU/∂k|k=0 > 0, kINTU ≥ k̄U , k̄U ≥ 0.
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The first condition assures that the constraint q = 1 hits before the Π = 0 constraint
and we can only consider the unconstrained region. Using the expressions for k̄U and k0 it
can be seen that the condition is satisfied for R ≥ RBE, where Rij denotes the boundary
between regions i and j, and RBE is defined by RBE = 3 − 12rE . The next two conditions
ensure that k̄U is optimal in the unconstrained region and thus also globally optimal; it can
be seen from ∂SWU/∂k, and the expressions for kINTU and k̄U that they are both satisfied
for R ≥ RBC , where RBC is defined by RBC = 2rE − 1. The last condition just requires k̄U
to be non-negative and is satisfied for R ≤ 3. This implies that the boundary with Region
A is at R = 3, as shown above.
Finally, using k = k̄U = 3− R and q = 1 in the expressions for the unconstrained case,
we obtain rL = R− 1, BS = 1, Π = 12 − (3−R)rE > 0, and SW =
1
2
− (3−R)rE > 0.
Region C : In this region, the global optimum value is at kINTU in the unconstrained case
(Π > 0) for q < 1. This requires:
kINTU ≤ k̄U , kINTU ≤ k0, ∂SWU/∂k|k=0 ≥ 0, k̄C < kINTC , SWU(kINTU ) ≥ SWC(k̄C).
Similarly to Region B, it can be shown these conditions imply R ≤ RBC , where RBC is given
above, R ≥ RCD = 4rE − 5, and R ≥ RCE = rE + (
p
rE − 8r2E + 10r3E − 3r4E)/rE.
It can be seen that the intersection of boundaries RBC and RCD is at rE = 2 and R = 3.
It can also be checked that RBE, RBC , and RCE intersect at rE = 1.866 and R = 2.732. Also
RCD and RCE intersect at rE = 1.933 and R = 2.732.
To conclude, the optimal value of k is kINTU = R+1−4(rE−1), and using the expressions
for the unconstrained region rL = 2(rE−1), q = R−2(rE−1) < 1, BS = (2−2rE+R)2 > 0,
Π = 1
2
(R+ 2)2 − 3(R+ 3)rE + 6r2E > 0, and SW = R
2
2
+R− (R+ 5)rE + 2r2E + 2 > 0.
Region D: In this region, the global optimum is at the value k = 0 in the unconstrained
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case (Π > 0) with q < 1. Sufficient conditions for this to hold are:
∂SWU
∂k
¯̄̄̄
k=0
< 0, k̄C < k
INT
C , SWU(0) ≥ SWC(k̄C).
These conditions imply the boundaries R ≥ RDE = (5
√
rE + 2
√
3 + rE)/3
√
rE, R ≤ RCD,
and R ≤ 3. It can be checked that RDE intersects with RCD and RDE at rE = 1.933 and
R = 2.732.
With k = 0 and q = R−1
2
< 1, we have that rL = R2 , BS =
1
4
R(R − 1) > 0, Π =
1
8
(R2 − 4R+ 3) > 0, and SW = 1
8
(3R2 − 2R− 9) > 0.
Region E : The global optimum is at the value k = k̄C = 12rE in the constrained case
(Π = 0) and q = 1. Sufficient conditions for this to hold are:
k0 ≤ k̄U , k̄C ≤ kINTC , SWC(k̄C) ≥ SWU(kINTU ), SWC(k̄C) ≥ SWU(0), SWC(k̄C) ≥ SWU(k0).
These conditions imply the boundaries are R ≤ RBE, R ≤ RCE, R ≤ RDE and R ≥ REF =
2− 1
2rE
.
Finally, given k = 1
2rE
, q = 1, and rL = 2 − 12rE , it can be shown that BS = SW =
R− (2− 1
2rE
) > 0, and Π = 0.
Region F: It can be seen that for the solution that is optimal in Region E where k = k̄C =
1
2rE
, SW = R− (2− 1
2rE
) < 0 for R < REF . However, this is not the only solution that might
be optimal in Region F. So far we have assumed throughout that k̄C ≤ kINTC . If this inequality
is reversed then kINTC is optimal. Using k̄C = 1/(2rE) and k
INT
C = rER
2/[2(2rE − 1)2], it
can be shown that the boundary for this constraint is R = 2− 1
rE
. For R > 2− 1
rE
, we have
k̄C ≤ kINTC . Since 2− 1rE < 2−
1
2rE
, it follows that k̄C ≤ kINTC holds in Regions C, D, and E
as required above.
For R ≤ 2 − 1
rE
, kINTC is the optimal solution. However, it can be shown using the
expressions for the constrained solution in Step 1 that SW < 0 for all these values of R and
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rE. Thus SW < 0 in Region F and there is no intermediation. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6: To prove this, we overlap Figures 3 and 4 and compare kBS and
kreg in each region to give Figure 5. We note first that the boundary between Regions A
and B in Figure 3 lies above the one between Regions E and F in Figure 4 and intersects the
boundary between regions D and E in Figure 4 at rE = 3.52. We consider now each region
of Figure 5 in turn. For clarity, in what follows we define the regions of Proposition 4 as 4.A
and 4.B, and those of Proposition 5 as 5.A-5.F. Regions without a prefix refer to Figure 5.
Region A: kBS > kreg. This region consists of Regions 5.A, 5.B, 5.C, and 5.D.
Region 5.A: It can be seen directly that kBS = 1
2rE
> kreg = 0.
Region 5.B: In this region for kBS > kreg to hold, it is necessary that kBS = 1
2rE
> kreg =
3 − R, or equivalently R > 3 − 1
2rE
. It can be seen directly that Region B satisfies this
constraint since the lower boundary is RBE = 3− 12rE .
Region 5.C: In this region for kBS > kreg to hold, it is necessary that kBS = 1
2rE
> kreg =
R+1−4(rE−1), or equivalently R ≤ 4rE−5+ 12rE . It can be seen that the boundary of this
intersects with R = 2rE−1 at the corner of Region 5.C where RBC = 2rE−1 intersects with
RBE = 3 − 1/2rE. It can straightforwardly be checked that apart from this point, Region
5.C lies below R = 4rE − 5 + 12rE so that k
BS > kreg.
Region 5.D: As already described, the boundary between Regions 4.A and 4.B intersects
with the boundary of Region 5.D so that we have to compare kBS as defined both in Regions
4.A and 4.B with kreg in Region 5.D. It is easy to see that kBS > kreg always since kreg = 0
in Region 5.D and kBS > 0 in both Regions 4.A and 4.B.
Region B: kBS = kreg. This region consists of the overlap between Region 4.A and
Region 5.E. It can be seen directly from Propositions 4 and 5 that kBS = kreg = 1
2rE
.
Region C: kBS < kreg.This region derives from overlapping Regions 4.B and 5.E. It holds
from Propositions 4 and 5 that kBS =
³
[
√
2rE −
p
2rE − 3(R− 1)]/3
´2
, and kreg = 1
2rE
. The
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boundary kBS = kreg is equivalent to R = 3 − 3
2rE
. This is the boundary for Regions 4.A
and 4.B for rE ≥ 32 . Now given that ∂kBS/∂R > 0, and that kreg =
1
2rE
is independent of R,
it follows that as R falls so does kBS/kREG. Thus, kBS < kreg for R < 3− 3
2rE
and rE ≥ 32 .
Consider now rE < 32 . We know from the proof of Proposition 4 that in this case
kMIN = kC at R = 3 − 32rE and that at the boundary between Regions 4.A and 4.B,
kBS < 1
2rE
. This, together with the fact that ∂k
BS
∂R
> 0, implies that kBS < kreg is satisfied
on the boundary between Regions 4.A and 4.B as well as below it. Thus, kBS < kreg.
Region D: kBS > 0 and there is no intermediation in the regulatory case. Here the
relevant areas are Regions 4.B and 5.F. ¤
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Figure 1: Timing of the model 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of market and regulatory solutions with no deposit insurance. The figure compares 
the level of capital in the market solution (kBS) and in the regulatory solution (kreg) in the case of no deposit 
insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure distinguishes four regions: 
Region A.1, as defined by 2,R ≥  where 1 2 0;BS regEk r k= > =  Region A.2, as defined by 
2ABR R≤ < with
2 3 4 2(4 2 2 6 4 ) ( 2 ) ,AB E E E E E E ER r r r r r r r= + + − + +  where
21 2 1 4;BS regEk r k R= > = −  Region B, as 
defined by 2 1 2 ,E ABr R R− ≤ <  where 1 2 ;
BS reg
Ek k r= =  and Region C, as defined by 2 1 2 ,ER r< −  where there 
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Figure 3: Market solution with deposit insurance. The figure shows the level of capital in the market solution 
(kBS) for the case of deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure 
distinguishes two regions: Region A, as defined by ,ABR R≥  where 1 2 ;
BS
Ek r=  and Region B, as defined 
by ,ABR R<  where ( )
2
2 2 3( 1) 3 .BS E Ek r r R= − − −  The boundary between the two regions is given 
by 3 2 3 8 2AB E ER r r= − + for 3 2Er < and by 3 3 2AB ER r= − for 3 2.Er ≥  The figure also shows the boundary for 
SW 0≥ . This coincides with RAB for 1.266Er < and equals R for 1.266,Er ≥  
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Figure 4: Regulatory solution with deposit insurance. The figure shows the level of capital in the regulatory 
solution (kreg) for the case of deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. 
The figure distinguishes six regions: Region A, as defined by 3,R ≥  where 0;regk =  Region B, as defined 
by 3BCR R≤ < and 3,BER R≤ <  where 3 ;
regk R= − Region C, as defined by 3,BCR R< <  3,CER R≤ <  and 
3,CDR R≤ <  where 1 4( 1);
reg
Ek R r= + − −  Region D, as defined by 3CDR R< <  and 3,DER R≤ <  where 
0;regk =  Region E, as defined by ,EFR R≤  ,BER R<  ,CER R<  and ,DER R<  where 1 2 ;
reg
Ek r=  Region F, as 
defined by ,EFR R<  where there is no intermediation. The boundaries between the regions are as 
follow: 2 1,BC ER r= −  3 1 2 ,BE ER r= −  
2 3 48 10 3 ,CE E E E E E ER r r r r r r= + − + −  4 5,CD ER r= −  
( )5 2 3 3 ,DE E E ER r r r= + +  and 2 1 2 .EF ER r= −  The proof of Proposition 5 contains the intersection points 
between the boundaries.      
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Figure 5: Comparison of market and regulatory solution with deposit insurance. The figure compares the 
levels of capital in the market solution (kBS) and regulatory solution (kreg) for the case of deposit insurance as a 
function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure distinguishes four regions: Region A, 
where ;BS regk k>  Region B, where ;BS regk k=  Region C, where ;BS regk k<  and Region D, where 0regk > and there 
is no intermediation with regulation. Region A exists for 3 1 2 ,BE ER R r≥ = −  
2 3 48 10 3 ,CE E E E E E ER R r r r r r r≥ = + − + −  and ( )5 2 3 3 ;DE E E ER R r r r≥ = + +  Region B exists between 
,BER R<  ,CER R<  ,DER R<  and ˆ,R R≥  where ˆ 3 2 3 8 2E ER r r= − + for 3 2Er < and ˆ 3 3 2 ER r= − for 3 2Er ≥ . 
Region C exists for ˆ2 1 2 ;Er R R− ≤ <  and Region D exists for 2 1 2 .ER r≥ −  The proof of Proposition 6 contains 
the intersection points between the boundaries of Regions A, B, and C.  
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